Kamikazes
About a month ago I was interested in writing about the parallels between the Palestinian bombers and the Japanese Kamikaze attacks in World War Two. Most of my kamikaze knowledge is a bit old and dusty, so I did a Google search. It turned up basically nothing. Many sites were selling products that used Kamikaze in the name such as
Kamikaze Records. One site that was actually about the Kamikazes was
down in honor of the 9/11 attack victims. The others contained little real information.
This is a shame, because we could learn much about the Palestinian bombers from understanding what motivated the Japanese to adopt suicide tactics. So a bit of background on the Kamikaze phenomenon and then some lessons that we might draw from it.
Kamikaze near missing an unidentified US destroyer
It is important to distinguish the Kamikaze attacks that began in late 1944 with earlier suicide attacks. Some pilots in World War II when their planes were heavily damaged or they were severely wounded opted to crash their planes into enemy targets. This trait was not something unique to the Japanese. On this scale suicide attacks were seen as heroic self sacrifice. Imagine Star Wars with an alternative ending where a mortal wounded Luke Skywalker chooses to crash his fighter into the Death Star to destroy it. This was not planned suicide. Instead it was the luck of the draw.
Where the Kamikazes differed was in intent. A Kamikaze took off with the sole intention of finding an American ship to crash into. The Japanese found themselves in a desperate situation by the fall of 1944. Their attempt to destroy the US fleet during the US invasion of the Marianas in June 1944 had resulted in a crushing defeat. The Imperial Navy had lost the bulk of its carrier based aircraft and trained pilots in a battle the Americans named The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. Japanese air power was now unable to penetrate the US fighters and anti-aircraft defenses to deliver conventional attacks. At the Marianas Japan lost over 400 planes (out of 430 engaged) and three aircraft carriers in exchange for 130 American planes and two ineffective hits on US battleships. When you include the fact that about 100 of the US planes were lost due to accidents during night landings the Japanese defeat is even more apparent.
American technology in the form of radar, advanced anti-aircraft defenses, and fighter direction doctrine combine with the falling experience levels of Japanese pilots made conventional attacks all but impossible. Sending pilots out to fight the US fleet was already seeming like a suicide mission. Some Japanese officers reasoned that if the pilots were dead men anyway, they might as well attack in ways that offered the best chance of success. The first suicide unit was the brainchild of Vice Admiral Onishi Takijiro of the First Air Fleet based in the Philippines- the obvious target for US invasion after the Marianas. The Japanese called them Special Attack Units. The name that stuck was Kamikaze meaning Divine Wind in reference to the typhoon that saved Japan from Mongol invasion hundreds of years before.
Kamikaze about to strike the battleship Missouri. It hit the armor belt below deck level and caused minor damage and no American causalities.
The first attacks were carried out during the American invasion of the Philippines in October 1944. They were small scale but in contrast to the ineffective conventional attacks they were very successful. Several American escort carriers were hit and one sank.
The shock factor was enormous. It took some time for the fact to dawn on the US Navy that this was not the typical isolated suicide attack. It was one thing to face men trying to kill you. It was quite another to fact men who were willing to suffer certain death to do it. And there was no where to run. You had to stand your ground and fight. Much of the US anti-aircraft arsenal was rendered useless. The lighter 20mm cannons lacked the range to knock down a Kamikaze before it hit the ship. These light guns had been very effective in forcing conventional attacks to miss or could down the planes after they had dropped their weapons and tried to escape. With a Kamikaze there was no escaping plane. Only the heavier 40mm and 5 inch guns had a chance to stop a Kamikaze before it impacted.
Ronald Spector's book Eagle Against the Sun describes the tension this way:
As the kamikaze battles continued, the nerves of the sailors within Fifth Fleet began to wear thin. Endless alerts, lack of sleep, the possibility of sudden, fiery death at any hour- all this began to take its psychological toll. In some cases, crews were so keyed up that they learned to listen for the telltale click and static of the ships' loudspeakers being activeate- they were running for their battle stations by the time "General Quarters" was sounded. American communications intelligence enabled the American commanders to anticipate the larger air attacks, and at first crews were alerted accordingly. "But this practice," recalled one correspondent, "had to be stopped. The strain of waiting, the anticipation of terror, made vivid from past experience, sent some men into hysteria, insanity, and breakdown."
In the early days of the Kamikazes, Japanese airmen were enthusiastic volunteers. The first flights had pilots selected by lots. Some pilots wrote their names in their own blood as a way to help convince their commanders that they should be chosen. Japanese soldiers were taught that it was glorious to die in the service of the Emperor. This did not always reflect itself in a desire to die as quickly as possible. Rather it served to convince them that death, when it came, was an honorable options.
American carrier Bunker Hill burning after being hit by two Kamikazes on 11 May 1945.
As the war continued the Japanese attitude began to change. It was increasingly obvious that the war was lost (it really had been lost since early 1943). The Japanese were willing to lay down their lives to protect their Homeland, but even they had second thoughts when their sacrifice appeared to be in vain. Attacks continued, but the number of eager volunteers declined. On land Japanese fighting on the islands of Iwo Jima and Okinawa were more likely to surrender than they had been early in the war (though that is a relative thing- the difference was between almost no prisoners and some prisoners).
On the American side, the war had taken on a grim and determined feel. The Pacific War had always been a very racial war, and the seeming disregard for life displayed by the Japanese only amplified that tendency. The end result of their fanatical behavior was the fire bombing of Japanese cities and the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
I see the following parallels between the Palestinian bombers and the Kamikazes:
- Desperation by the leadership. The Kamikazes were not a spontaneous idea by desperate Japanese soldiers. It was a concept developed by a desperate leadership. Japan refused to surrender because the military effectively controlled the government. Any surrender would have lead to the eliminate of military rule and was thus unacceptable. The same situation among the Palestinians. The leadership has failed to win a conventional fight with Israel. They have failed to win a guerilla war. So now they have resorted to suicide attacks because the alternative would be to admit defeat and be swept from power.
- Suicide attacks are a sign of weakness, not strength. The side initiating such attacks will claim it proves their moral superiority. The Japanese frequently asserted that thier indominable spirit would turn back the American tide. Similar sounding claims echo from the Palestinian bombers. But in fact suicide attacks are signs of weakness and an inability to prevail at less drastic levels of confrontation or violence. Suicide tactics are the final roll of the dice and a sign that outright defeat is on the way.
- Shock value. The suicide attacks (and you can include 9/11 here) certainly got the world's attention. In the short run that shock puts extreme pressure on the suicide attack targets. In the long run it will prove self defeating because it tells the target that the gloves are off and anything goes. This is a hideous mistake against an enemy that has already proved able to defeat your conventional warfare efforts. It will allow your enemies to justify the most brutal methods of defense and tends to destroy any interest in a negotiated peace.
- Hard to defend against. It proved very hard to shoot down a plane determined to hit you. The same can be said of the Palestinian bombers. Someone willing to die in the attempt is much harder to defend against.
- Extended defense as the solution. The US Navy adopted a system of extended defense to combat the Kamikazes. Radar equipped destroyers served as pickets to allow fighters to intercept the Kamikazes as far from the fleet as possible. Israel has moved into the West Bank to perform a similar function. Note the relative absence of attacks during the Israeli offensive.
- Eventual loss of morale among the attackers. The early success can be intoxicating, but eventually successful defensive efforts, the lack of victory, and the tension between the words of the leaders urging you to blow yourself up and their unwillingness to do the same will wear down the suicide attacker's morale. The attacker able to use nationalism or religion as a rallying point will most likely always find someone willing to use their body as a bomb, but the number of willing volunteers will being to dry up. Contrary to the rhetoric, no society has ever proved willing to commit mass suicide.
The tactics being used by Israel will eventually defeat the Palestinian terror campaign. The cost will not be light because there will be more attacks before the Palestinian Kamikazes burn themselves out.
UPDATE:
Just read one of today's Opinion Journal articles on
Muslim justification for suicide bombings by Amir Taheri. Some of the quotes remind me of Japanese statements during the war. Contrast these:
From Amir Taheri's article:
Algeria's president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, has described the bombers as "innocent blossoms of martyrdom."
From
John Dower's War Without Mercy: The falling cherry blossom became the best known symbol of the [kamikaze] flyers, appearing in their poems, their songs, their farewell letters, and in the hands of the virgin school girls who assembled to see them off on their final missions in the spring of 1945.
From Amir Taheri's article:
Ghazi Algosaibi, Saudi Arabia's ambassador in London and also a poet, has praised the human bombs as a model for Muslim youth in an ode.
From John Dower's book:
Vice Admiral Onishi Takijiro, with whom the idea of the Special Attack Forces originated, often inscribed this line when asked for a sample of his fine calligraphy: "The purity of youth will usher in the Divine Wind"
From Amir Taheri's article:
Ismail Abushanab, the Hamas leader in Gaza, says that 10,000 Palestinians should die while killing 100,000 Israelis as part of a strategy to "put the Jews on the run."
From Ronald Spector's
Eagle Against the Sun describing the Japanese plans to defend Iwo Jima:
On the walls of pillboxes and bunkers Kuribayashi [the Japanese commander] had posted copies of the "Courageous Battle Vow" which pledged the defenders to "kill ten of the enemy before dying."
The more things change.....
